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Abstract. This article deals with photovoltaic power stations 
acting as possible fire hotbeds and simultaneously fire tolls. Main 
PV features defining fire risks of alone standing or on building 
mounted power station are discussed. Analyses described in main 
chapter are based on real case of a lightning strike. Divergence 
between direct lightning strike and close lightning strike is deeply 
illustrated and possible protections are discussed. Following 
paragraphs deal with fire rating and fire performance of particular 
PV panels, relevant dangers for acting firemen, extinguishing 
ways, particular fire progress and secondary hazards. The 
problematic is demonstrated on the base of experimental 
photovoltaic plant fire and real examples of injured panels. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Each component of photovoltaic power station is fully 
exposed to ambient conditions including several types of 
particular unpleasant effects. These situations can affect 
only operation and life cycle of the system itself, but some 
of them can lead up to malfunctions or injuries resulting in 
extreme case in the fire. Reciprocal accouplement with 
surrounding structures and objects can then lead to 
significant additional economical losses. By contrast the 
neighbouring objects can during innate fire affect the 
power station with the same results [1], [2]. 
 
2 main common design cases depending on PV power 
plant purpose have different effect. First case is a domestic 
or industrial power station installed either on the roof or on 
the walls of a building. Direct linking between the power 
plant components and the building structure is evident. 
Second case represents large stand alone PV power plant 
with no important surrounding objects [4]. 
Events with natural background or specific human 
activities can, from our point of view, abstractedly on the 
motive lead in the consequence to the fire. PV power 
stations installed on buildings are more endangered then 
stand alone installations. The fire can be initiated inside 
the building independently of the plant components. 
Faulty electrical installations, defective house appliances 
or some misfortune events are good examples. On the 
other hand PV plant components can itself initiate the 
fire. Electrical component malfunctions or unpredictable 
result of natural events are typical events. Fig. 1 shows 
roof mounted PV power plant after fire of the building. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Roof mounted PV power plant after fire. 
 
One of the most destructive natural events is the lightning 
strike. The lightning strikes directly into the power plant 
or the discharge hits some surrounding constructions. PV 
panels are fully destructed. Strong lightning current melts 
metal panel frame and the semiconductor structures. The 
results can be compared to the direct fire exposition 
presented on Fig. 1.  
 
Large stand alone PV power plants are paradoxically 
smaller problem from the fire point of view. These 
systems are usually installed on a free area. No 
surrounding objects are to be affected or to affect the 
plant as demonstrated on Fig. 2 [3]. 
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Fig. 2. Stand alone PV power plant after fire. 
 
The research is based on analysis of several practical cases 
and model situations, while almost no theoretical 
backgrounds are affordable [5]. 
 
These events are rather rare, but mechanical damages, 
wires broken during storm winds or bitted by animals can 
lead to the same results. Damage of the plant and building 
structures is visually evident and also affected panels can 
be easily identified [4], [5]. 
 
The other situation is much more frequent. Consequences 
are more difficult to identify, because the damage itself is 
caused only by some overvoltage. Although the 
semiconductor structures show serious malfunctions, the 
panel and surrounding objects are visually not affected or 
the particular degradation is almost not evident. Fig. 3 
shows smoke traces on the backside of a panel damaged 
during lightning strike into close chestnut tree [3]. 
 
Fig. 3.  PV panel damage after close lightning strike. 
 
2.  Analyses of the close lightning strike 
 
Commercial photovoltaic power station “A” was damaged 
during a storm. Decreased power production during 
following days logged at output side of the power station 
indicated some malfunction of the system. 
 
Quick service check detected extensive problems in string 
No. 1. No visible damage was evident but neither output 
string voltage, nor output string current reached the 
nominal values. These attributes indicated internal 
malfunction of one or more panels in the string. 
Particular analysis discovered one specific panel 
CanadianSolar CS6P-245P declaring malfunctions. Also 
serious damage of the string inverter was detected. 
 
Power plant is installed on base metal structure anchored 
on flat roof of an industrial hall. Although the system is 
covered with protection angle of primary lightning 
protection system, auxiliary lightning rods were 
connected to the original conductors. Surge guards 
installed in central switch board represent secondary 
protection. No damage of protection system was 
identified. 
 
Subsequently a lightning hit into chestnut tree standing 
15 m far from the industrial hall was located. Few 
superior branches were broken off and the trunk showed 
burn traces from the lightning downlead. Because the 
trunk had not been split, the lightning was classified as 
rather small. Close distance between the tree and the 
industrial hall caused that overvoltage had been induced 
between the supporting structure and wiring of the 
photovoltaic power plant [3]. 
 
Existence of the storm was explicitly documented from 
meteorological reports and radar snapshots archived by 
Czech hydro meteorological institute (CHMU). 
 
The panel analysis was performed in the Laboratory of 
renewable energy sources belonging to Faculty of 
electrical engineering at University of West Bohemia. 
Analyzer HT Solar I-V 400 was used. Electrical 
measurements in real conditions were supplemented with 
synchronous measurements of panel temperature and 
incidenting radiation. The radiation oscillated between 
315 and 983 W/m2 while the panel temperature alternated 
between 12.1 and 30.3 °C. 
 
No usable VA-characteristic was recorded. Example 
measured in conditions very close to STC (Ip = 983 
W/m2, tP = 26.8 °C) is demonstrated on Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. VA-characteristic of tested panel. 
https://doi.org/10.24084/repqj17.274 230 RE&PQJ, Volume No.17, July 2019
The nominal output voltage of the tested panel at STC is 
UMAX = 35.6 V and nominal current is IMAX = 6.7 A. The 
output voltage dropped almost to 0 V while the output 
current almost did not ascended above 0 A once the load 
was connected to the panel during the measurements. The 
panel was disconnected and shaded to cool down before 
this measurement to get as close to STC as possible for the 
particular experiment. 
 
As evident from Fig. 4 maximum power point (MPP) was 
also not measured. The only sign of partial functionality is 
some low value of open circuit voltage recorded during 
additional measurements and presented in Table 1. 
TABLE I.  OPEN CIRCUIT VOLTAGE OF TESTED PANEL 
IP [W/m2] 92 157 204 261 309 360 448 
tP [°C] 18.5 19.1 19.4 19.9 20.3 21.6 25.7 
U0 [V] 10.28 10.29 10.31 10.33 10.37 10.39 10.44 
IP [W/m2] 516 572 612 663 691 737 865 
tP [°C] 26.4 28.1 29.8 31.2 32.1 34.9 36.3 
U0 [V] 10.45 10.47 10.48 10.52 10.56 10.59 10.64 
 
Built in bypass diodes were disassembled from the wiring 
box and measured separately. No diode malfunction was 
detected while all strings of the panel are affected by the 
lightning event. Despite of heavy panel damage, no fire 
was initiated. 
 
3. Simulation of direct lightning strike 
 
Experimental monocrystalline Si panel Solartec STR-36-
13 was tested in high voltage laboratory of University of 
West Bohemia as target of high voltage discharge to 
simulate direct lightning strike. Metal frame of the panel 
was grounded (electrode 1) while the high voltage 
(electrode 2) was connected to the surface of the panel. 
 
Firstly surge pulse generator EM Test VCS 500 was used 
to generate voltage pulses up to 10 kV. Panel VA 
characteristic and basic values were measured after each 
pulse to verify status of the panel. No panel breakdown 
was detected as evident from Table 2. 
 
Nominal values of the panel (prior all experiments) are 
summarized in the first column (Up = 0 kV). 
TABLE II.  PANEL CONDITIONS AFTER HV PULSE (10 KV) 
UP [kV] 0 2 4 6 8 9 10 
U0C [V] 21,56 21,55 21,56 21,57 21,54 21,55 21,57 
ISC [A] 0,82 0,82 0,83 0,83 0,81 0,82 0,81 
UMPP [V] 17,42 17,41 17,41 17,41 17,44 17,43 17,43 
IMPP [A] 0,74 0,75 0,74 0,73 0,75 0,75 0,73 
PMPP [W] 12,89 13,05 12,88 12,71 13,08 13,07 12,73 
 
Sample waveform printscreen of generated HV pulses for 
Up = 2 kV is demonstrated on Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Sample pulse 2 kV (EM Test VCS 500). 
 
Because no evident influence was detected, the panel was 
connected to 8 stage HV generator Heafely capable to 
simulate atmospherical pulses 1,2/50 µs up to 600 kV. 
Table 3 illustrates panel status after particular tests. 
TABLE III.  PANEL CONDITIONS AFTER HV PULSE (600 KV) 
UP [kV] 50 100 200 300 400 500 600 
U0C [V] 21,53 21,54 21,58 21,52 21,56 21,57 21,53 
ISC [A] 0,81 0,83 0,83 0,84 0,86 0,85 0,86 
UMPP [V] 17,44 17,45 17,43 17,42 17,46 17,42 17,44 
IMPP [A] 0,76 0,74 0,73 0,74 0,74 0,76 0,75 
PMPP [W] 13,25 12,91 12,72 12,89 12,92 13,23 13,08 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 show that no measurable panel 
damage was detected on VA characteristics. That could 
be explained with insufficient energy of generated pulses 
although the discharges produced very dramatic visual 
effects as demonstrated on Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6. Sample pulse 600 kV (Heafely generator). 
 
Sample VA and power characteristic after all 
measurements is displayed on Fig. 7. No deformation 
similar to Fig. 4 is evident and the values are proper to 
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nominal listed in Table 2. Also no visual damage similar to 
Fig. 2 was detected. 
 
Demonstration discharges did not simulate direct lightning 
strike with proper results. 
 
Fig. 7. VA characteristic after all tests. 
 
 
4. Experimental fire of model PV power 
plant 
 
To analyze all real conditions and features experimental 
fire of model power plant was prepared. Main goals of this 
particular experiment were defined: 
 
• dangers for the firemen 
• fire rating and fire performance 
• ways of extinguishing 
• secondary hazards 
• progress of fire 
 
Experimental PV plant was built on the roof of an old 
military building determined to be demolished. 
Configuration of the experimental plant on the building 
roof is displayed on Fig. 8. 
Fig. 8. Experimental PV plant configuration. 
 
Special additional measure lines were designed and 
thermally shielded in wooden canals to acquire relevant 
data during the fire. Panel temperatures, output voltage and 
current, VA characteristic and thermographs were 
measured periodically. 
 
The power station consisted from 4 strings wired from 12 
monocrystalline Si panels Solartec ST-36-53. Particular 
separate strings were installed on different roofing 
materials: 
 
• roof tiles 
• metal plates 
• tar paper 
 
Ambient conditions were defined by cloudy weather with 
solar radiation varying between 150 – 250 W/m2 and air 
temperatures from 8 °C to 11 °C. Although these 
conditions are far from STC and are less positive for 
power generation from PV plants, define practical limits 
for PV plant operation and thus margins for fire of 
operating PV power station. 
 
Dangers for the fire fighters entering the object with PV 
power plant and secondary hazards during and after the  
fire were identified and discussed with fire department 
during the preparation phase: 
 
• touch voltage (AC, DC) 
• step voltage (AC, DC) 
• DC currents (water electrolysis – H2 production) 
• DC shortcuts (fire reinitiation) 
• DC sparks (fire reinitiation) 
 
Fig. 9 presents sample measurement of secondary 
hazards – DC sparks. One of the output wires from PV 
string was grounded while the second one was freely and 
randomly used to ignite sparks on surrounding objects. 
 
This situation often happens, when power wires are 
broken (burned or cut) and loosely hanging in the space. 
Any contact between the wires among each other can 
ignite a spark. Also random touch of one wire with some 
metal object (water drips, pipes, girders, sheetmetals, 
etc.) while the second wire is in synchronous contact with 
that object can initiate shortcut current and/or sparks. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Sample of secondary hazards – DC sparks. 
 
Although the ambient conditions were not ideal, 
experiments proved that these sparks have enough energy 
to initiate a fire of several typical flammable materials as 
shown on Fig. 10. 
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Fig. 10. Energy of sample DC sparks. 
 
Surprisingly usage of low pressure or high pressure water 
beam (with complementary insulation devices) was found 
as the best way of extinguishing. Extinguishing foam and 
powder demonstrated weak and unstable effects. 
 
DC currents represent also another type of hazard that 
must be on mind while using water beam for 
extinguishing. Water electrolysis occurs in wet ambient, 
what means H2 and O2 production. Any higher H2 
concentration brings high explosion risk especially in 
environment with common initiating electric sparks. 
Fig. 11 demonstrates generation and caption of H2 in some 
enclosed space (plastic bottle). 
 
 
Fig. 10. H2 generation in enclosed space. 
 
The fire was artificially initiated in the right front corner of 
the attic under fire department supervision. Firstly the 
string on the tar paper roof was affected, then both strings 
on metal roof and finally the string on tiled roof. The roof 
collapsed in time 10:35 min and panels were almost 
destroyed as evident on Fig. 1. The fire was kept down 
after 14:00 min while the typical fire progress is: 
 
• 0. min: fire initiation 
• 2. min: fire detection 
• 3. min: call to fire department 
• 5. min: departure of fire units (distance 10 km) 
• 15. min: start of fire attack 
 
Measured VA and power characteristics of string 1 
during the fire are presented on Fig. 11, Fig. 12 and 
Fig. 13. The partial power decrease on Fig. 12 can be 
explained with smoke shading the panels, while Fig. 13 
shows zero output of damaged string. 
 
Fig. 11. Sample VA characteristic (time 0:00 min) 
Fig. 12. Sample VA characteristic (time 6:35 min) 
Fig. 13. Sample VA characteristic (time 10:12 min) 
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Sample thermogram from the fire progress (4:45 min) is 
demonstrated on Fig. 14. Panels on metal roof (middle of 
the picture) and panels on tiles (left part of the picture) are 
not affected yet, while panels on the tar roof are in the 
flames (upper right part of the picture). 
 
Fig. 14. Sample thermogram (time 4:45 min). 
 
Fig. 15 shows the output voltage of all strings. It is evident 
that voltage fluctuated and even exceeded the nominal 
value. This unpredicted behaviour has simple explanation. 
Burned wires composed random temporary connections 
leading to overvoltage and even reverse voltage on the 
string output. 
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Fig. 15. Output voltage during the fire. 
5. Conclusion 
 
Described experiments and measurements demonstrate 
particular effects of specific types of natural events and 
human activities on photovoltaic power plant operation. 
 
Analysis and simulations of close and direct lightning 
strike show dissimilar influence on the innate PV plant 
and surrounding constructions. Close lightning strike can 
induce harmful voltage to power cables or to surrounding 
structures that is capable to injure the panels without 
additional consequences, while direct lightning strike is 
powerful enough to completely damage the devices and 
also to initiate a fire. 
 
Direct fire incidence on photovoltaic plant always means 
serious results. Beyond typical effects such as touch and 
step voltage, DC currents characteristic means specific 
hazards as H2O electrolysis and DC sparks. It is also 
evident that actual voltage value can not be predicted in 
any way and can reach dangerous values, although the 
nominal value is safe. 
 
The paper was supported by SGS-2018-023. 
 
References 
 
[1]  DEHN, “Photovoltaic power stations and lightning 
strike protection, online,” [Cit. 3.12.2013.]. 
[2]  M. Libra, V. Poulek, „Solarni energie”, CZU, Praha, 
2005. 
[3]  M. Belik, “Measurement on PV panel CanadianSolar 
CS6P-245P damaged during close lightning strike, 
measurement report” ZCU, Pilsen, 2013. 
[4] M. Stransky, “Analysis of damaged PV panels, 
Master thesis”, ZCU, Pilsen, 2014. 
[5] O. Nikl, “Analysis of VA characteristics for PV 
power plant, Master thesis”, ZCU, Pilsen, 2016 
  
https://doi.org/10.24084/repqj17.274 234 RE&PQJ, Volume No.17, July 2019
